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Abstract
Since 1995, much work has been done creating proto-
cols for private information retrieval (PIR). Many variants
of the basic PIR model have been proposed, including such
modiﬁcations as computational vs. information-theoretic
privacy protection, correctness in the face of servers that
fail to respond or that respond incorrectly, and protection
of sensitive data against the database servers themselves.
In this paper, we improve on the robustness of PIR in a
number of ways. First, we present a Byzantine-robust PIR
protocol which provides information-theoretic privacy pro-
tectionagainstcoalitionsof upto all but oneof therespond-
ing servers, improving the previous result by a factor of 3.
In addition, our protocol allows for more of the responding
servers to return incorrect information while still enabling
the user to compute the correct result.
We then extend our protocol so that queries have
information-theoretic protection if a limited number of
servers collude, as before, but still retain computational
protection if they all collude. We also extend the protocol
to provide information-theoretic protection to the contents
of the database against collusions of limited numbers of the
database servers, at no additional communication cost or
increase in the number of servers. All of our protocols re-
trieve a block of data with communication cost only O(ℓ)
times the size of the block, where ℓ is the number of servers.
Finally, we discuss our implementation of these proto-
cols, and measure their performance in order to determine
their practicality.
1. Introduction
Private information retrieval (PIR) [4] is the task of
fetching an item from a database server without the server
learning which item you are interested in. In the context
of PIR, an “item” is often thought of as a single bit out of
an n-bit database, but it could also be a “block” of size b
bits. In the latter case, the n-bit database is consideredto be
composed of n/b blocks, each of size b bits. A number of
applications have been proposed for PIR, including patent
and pharmaceutical databases [1], online census informa-
tion [17], and real-time stock quotes [17]. The Pynchon
Gate [11] shows how to use PIR for an arguably more real-
istic purpose: retrieving pseudonymously addressed email;
it argues that PIR is a more suitable primitive for this appli-
cation than previous proposals.
A trivial solution to the PIR problem is simply to ask
the server for the whole database and look up the desired
bit or block yourself. To make things more interesting (not
to mention practical), we analyze the communication cost
of the protocol—the total number of bits transmitted—and
insist that it be sublinear; that is, less than n.
There are two main types of PIR: information-theoretic
and computational. In information-theoreticPIR, the server
is unable to determine any information about your query
even with unbounded computing power. In computational
PIR (CPIR) [3, 8], the privacy of the query need only
be guaranteed against servers restricted to polynomial-time
computations. Note that in the information-theoretic case
the unbounded power is only to be used to try to compro-
mise your privacy; in either case we still insist that you and
the servers use only polynomial-timecomputations in order
to perform the protocol.
It is an unsurprising fact that information-theoretic sub-
linear PIR is impossible with a single server. However, it is
possible when there are ℓ servers, each with a copy of the
database—assuming that the servers do not collude in order
to determine your query. A t-private ℓ-server PIR is a PIR
system in which the privacy of the query is information-
theoretically protected, even if up to t of the ℓ servers col-
lude. (Of course, it must be the case that t < ℓ.)
Beimel and Stahl [2] investigate the case where servers
can fail to respond. In this event, it is important that theclient still be able to retrieve her answer. If only k of the ℓ
servers need to respond, and no coalition of up to t servers
can learn any information about the query, they call such a
system t-private k-out-of-ℓPIR. In addition, they examine
systems where, of the k servers that replied (out of ℓ total),
v of those k are Byzantine; that is, they can return incorrect
answers, possibly chosen maliciously or possibly computed
in error (because, for example, the server may have an out-
of-date copy of the database). However, even with these in-
correct answers, the client should still be able to reconstruct
the correct database item, and as a side effect, determine
which of the servers gave incorrect answers. They term this
t-private v-Byzantine-robust k-out-of-ℓ PIR, and show
that such systems exist for v ≤ t < k
3. Yang et al. [17] pro-
pose a PIR protocol for which v ≤ t < k
2, but the client’s
reconstructionofthe correctdatablockinthat protocoldoes
not run in polynomial time.
Gertner, Goldwasser, and Malkin [5] consider that keep-
ing ℓ replicated copies of the database may itself be a secu-
rity or a privacy risk. They examine PIR protocols where
no coalition of up to τ servers can determine the con-
tents of the database (information-theoretically). They call
this τ-independent PIR. They show that they can add τ-
independenceto any PIR protocolat the expenseof increas-
ing the number of servers and the communication cost.
Inthispaper,we improvetherobustnessofPIR inanum-
ber of ways. First, we allow more servers to collude with-
outcompromisingprivacy,whilealsoallowingmoreservers
to be Byzantine. In particular, we construct a t-private v-
Byzantine-robustk-out-of-ℓPIR protocolforany0 < t < k
andv < k−⌊
√
kt⌋. We showthisis alwaysastrictimprove-
ment over the previous result, except when (t,k) = (1,4),
where it is the same.
Second, we extend this ﬁrst protocol to handle the case
in which more than t servers collude. In existing t-private
PIR systems, a coalition of more than t servers can eas-
ily reconstruct the query. We produce a PIR system which
has hybrid privacy protection: if up to t servers collude,
the query is protected information-theoretically, as before;
however, if more than t servers collude, the query is still
protected computationally. This means that coalitions of up
to t servers with unbounded computational power, or of up
to all ℓ servers with polynomially bounded computational
power, will be unable to determine the client’s query.
Finally, we give a second extension that can add τ-
independenceto our protocol,for 0 ≤ τ < k−t−v(2− v
k),
with no increase in the number of servers or in communica-
tion cost.
Each variant of our protocol has communication cost
only O(ℓ) times the size of the data block being retrieved.
At the end of this paper, we brieﬂy discuss our imple-
mentationofthisprotocol,andgivesomeperformancemea-
surements.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
We will denote by Zm the ring of integers modulo m,
and by Z∗
m the multiplicative group of invertible integers
modulo m. For primes p, we will denote by Fp the ﬁnite
ﬁeld of integers modulo p.
We will denote by δij the Kronecker delta function; that
is: δij =
￿
1 i = j
0 i  = j .
Let ǫ be the empty string, and s||t be the concatenation
of strings s and t.
2.2. Shamir secret sharing
Sharing of ﬁnite ﬁeld elements. Our technique is based
on Shamir secret sharing[14], which we will brieﬂy review.
Given a ﬁnite ﬁeld F, and a secret σ ∈ F, we can construct
t-private ℓ-way shares of the secret in the following way:
1. Choose ℓ distinct non-zero elements α1,...,αℓ of F.
They can be chosen from any distribution; they need
not be uniformly distributed. It is even acceptable to
simply use α1 = 1,α2 = 2, etc. when {1,2,...,ℓ} ⊆
F\{0}. We call the αi indices.
2. Select t elements σ1,...,σt of F uniformlyat random.
3. Construct the polynomial f(x) = σ + σ1x + σ2x2 +
    + σtxt.
4. The ℓ shares are f(α1),...,f(αℓ).
Given any t + 1 of the shares, one can recover the poly-
nomial f by Lagrange interpolation and thus determine
σ = f(0). However, given only t or fewer shares, no infor-
mation at all about σ is revealed. Because of this, dividing
a secret into t-private ℓ-way shares in this way is also called
(t + 1)-of-ℓ Shamir secret sharing.
Sharingofringelements. CommonchoicesforF, above,
include GF(2d) and Fp. But with minor care, it turns out
that the above technique works in some non-ﬁelds as well.
The proof of the technique from [14] only requires that we
arein a ﬁnitecommutativering, thatαi is invertibleforeach
1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ and that αi − αj is invertible for each 1 ≤ i <
j ≤ ℓ.
In particular, we will wish to share elements of rings
Zpq of integers modulo products of two distinct primes p
and q. Note that p and q do not need to be a secret. In
this scenario, shares are constructed and the secret is re-
constructed in exactly the same way as before. The only
caveat is in the selection of the αi. Whereas in the case of
a ﬁnite ﬁeld, we only needed that the αi be non-zero anddistinct, in the modulo pq case, we need that the αi be non-
zero and distinct modulo each of p and q separately. An
easy way to ensure this is to choose the αi from the set
{1,2,...,min(p,q) − 1}.
Sharing of vectors. Let   v be a vector [v1,...,vr] of
lengthr, whose entriesareelements ofeithera ﬁnite ﬁeldor
a ring Zpq, as above. We can make t-private ℓ-way shares
of   v by simply independently sharing each of the entries.
That is, if xj1,...,xjℓ are t-private ℓ-way shares of vj (for
1 ≤ j ≤ r), then [x11,...,xr1],...,[x1ℓ,...,xrℓ] are t-
private ℓ-way shares of   v.
2.3. The Paillier cryptosystem
The Paillier public-keycryptosystem [10] is another tool
we will use. The cryptosystem is as follows:
Key Generation: Select random primes p and q of some
desiredlength, and set m = pq and λ = lcm(p−1,q−
1). Deﬁne the function L(u) = (u − 1)/m. Choose
a random g ∈ Z∗
m2 and ensure that   = (L(gλ mod
m2))−1 mod m exists. The public encryption key is
then (m,g) and the private decryption key is (λ, ).
Encryption: To encrypt a plaintext P ∈ Zm, select a
random ρ ∈ Z∗
m, and compute the ciphertext to be
C = E(P) = gP   ρm mod m2. Note that, as usual, E
is a randomized function.
Decryption: To decrypt a ciphertext C, compute D(C) =
L(Cλ mod m2)     mod m.
Note that it is of course the case that D(E(P)) = P for
all P ∈ Zm.
The security of the Paillier cryptosystem is based on the
Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA).
That is, for a ﬁxed public key m, this system is semanti-
cally secure if and only if an adversary cannot determine
whether or not a given random element of Z∗
m2 has an mth
root.
The Paillier cryptosystem has one additional property
that is vital for our purposes. It is additive homomor-
phic; that is, multiplying two encryptions together (mod-
ulo m2) gives an encryption of the sum of the original mes-
sages (modulom). Formally, D(E(P1) E(P2) mod m2) =
P1 + P2 mod m.
3. Improving Byzantine robustness
We motivate our study of Byzantine robustness by look-
ingat thePynchonGate [11]. ThePynchonGate is a system
that uses private information retrieval to enable the delivery
of email to pseudonymous recipients. Greatly simpliﬁed,
the system works like this:
• Email arrives at the mail server, des-
tined for a pseudonymous user, say
<wiseone@pynchon.example>.
• The mail server encrypts the message using a key
known by the owner of the pseudonym, and puts the
encrypted message in the PIR database (distributing it
to ℓ database servers). Note that the server does not
know who the owner of the pseudonym is.
• At some point, Joe (the owner of the pseudonym)does
a PIR query on the database to retrieve the mail for
the pseudonym <wiseone@pynchon.example>.
The privacy guarantees of the PIR technique assure
that, unless all ℓ database servers collude, they will be
unable to link the client of the query, Joe, to the value
of the query, <wiseone@pynchon.example>.
• Joe decrypts and reads the resulting message.
The Pynchon Gate uses a PIR protocol from Chor et
al. [4], which is shown in Figure 1. It is straightforward
to see that this is an (ℓ − 1)-private ℓ-server PIR with
information-theoretic protection.1 Its communication cost
is ℓ(r +b) = ℓ(n/b+ b). Choosing b to be
√
n gives a cost
of 2ℓ
√
n.
However, as reported by Sassaman and Preneel [12],
this protocol has a weakness in the presence of Byzan-
tine servers: Joe will be unable to reconstruct the message.
Worse, although the Pynchon Gate guarantees Joe will be
able to tell that some server was Byzantine, he will be un-
able to tell which server it was. Therefore, it is important
to produce PIR protocols that not only can allow the client
to reconstruct the correct answer, but will also let the client
know which servers were Byzantine.
To accomplish this goal, we note that steps P2 and P3 of
the Pynchon Gate PIR protocol in Figure 1 form (ℓ − 1)-
private ℓ-way shares of the secret eβ (though not with
Shamir’s method). We replace these steps with a more gen-
eral t-private ℓ-way Shamir secret sharing of eβ. Note that
bitstrings of length r are equivalent to vectors of length r
over F2. We now consider eβ not as a vector over F2, but
rather as a vector of length r over some larger structure S.
We still have that the βth entry of eβ is 1, and the other en-
tries are 0, but now these entries are elements of S, and not
just F2. S might be a ﬁeld (such as GF(2d) for some d, or
Fp for some prime p) or a ring Zpq for some distinct primes
p and q. Let I be a set of Shamir indices in S; that is, if S
is a ﬁeld, I can just be the non-zero elements of S; if S is
Zpq, I can be the set {1,2,...,min(p,q)−1}, as in section
1The authors of the Pynchon Gate [11] mistakenly claim that, as an
optimization, the client may send ℓ−1 of the servers a key for a stream ci-
pher instead of a randomly generated bit string of length r. In reality, doing
so reduces the protection provided from information-theoretic to computa-
tional.Parameters:
ℓ: number of servers
n: size of the database (in bits)
b: size of each block (in bits)
Calculate:
r: number of blocks = n/b
Client (querying for block number β):
P1. Let eβ be the bit string of length r that is all 0s, except for position β, which is 1.
P2. Generate ℓ − 1 random bit strings ρ1,...,ρℓ−1, each of length r.
P3. Compute ρℓ = ρ1 ⊕     ⊕ ρℓ−1 ⊕ eβ.
P4. Send ρi to server number i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
Each server:
S1. Receive ρi = ρi1    ρir, a bitstring of length r.
S2. Let Bj be the jth b-bit block of the database for 1 ≤ j ≤ r.
S3. Compute Ri to be the XOR of all the Bj for which ρij = 1.
S4. Return Ri to the client.
Client:
C1. Receive R1,...,Rℓ.
C2. Compute B = R1 ⊕     ⊕ Rℓ.
Figure 1. The PIR protocol from Chor et al. [4] used by the Pynchon Gate [11].
2.2. The only restriction on S is that I have at least ℓ ele-
ments, thoughwe will see later that it sometimes beneﬁts us
to choose substantially larger I. We take ℓ random elements
of I as the indices in the Shamir secret sharing, and use
them to produce the ρi. An important property of Shamir
indices is that our usual intuitions about polynomials over
ﬁelds, such as distinct degree t polynomials agreeing on at
most t points, continue to hold in a ring setting providedwe
restrict our attention to indices selected from I.
Similarly to eβ, in the Pynchon Gate protocol we can
consider the ρi to be vectors of length r over F2, and the
Ri and Bj to be vectors of length b over F2. In this case,
we see that the computation of Ri in step S3 is the same as
computing Ric =
P
ρijBjc over F2 for 1 ≤ c ≤ b. When
we move to a larger structure S, the servers perform this
same computation, but over S.
The secret recovery is more complicated than that of
the Pynchon Gate, not only since recovering a secret from
Shamir shares is more complicated than recovering from a
simple(ℓ−1)-privateℓ-wayXORscheme,butalsosince we
willneedto handleByzantineservers. Therecoveryscheme
will use the following function Γ: Given a structure S, a list
of ℓ indices [α1,...,αℓ] in S, a list of ℓ values [R1,...,Rℓ]
inS∪{⊥},andapolynomialφoverS, letΓ(φ) bethesubset
of {1,...,ℓ} such that φ(αi) = Ri for i ∈ Γ(φ). Note that
we keep S and the lists αi and Ri implicit in the notation
for convenience.
The resulting PIR protocol is shown in Figure 2. It uses
two subroutines, EASYRECOVER and HARDRECOVER,
which are shown in Figure 3. An important fact about
these subroutines is that EASYRECOVER is just a less com-
putationally expensive method to get the same answer as
HARDRECOVER, but it only works some of the time:
Fact 1. If EASYRECOVER returns a non-empty set on a
given input, then HARDRECOVER will return the same set
on that same input.
Proof. HARDRECOVER ﬁnds all polynomials φ of degree
at most t for which |Γ(φ)| ≥ h, where h = k − v is
the desired minimum number of honest (non-Byzantine)
servers. EASYRECOVER is a less expensive procedure to
perform the same calculation, in the event that there is ex-
actly one such polynomial. EASYRECOVER selects t+1 of
the servers at random, and optimistically assumes that all of
those servers returned the correct answer. It calculates the
φ uniquely determined by those servers’ answers, and sees
how many other servers gave answers consistent with that
polynomial. The key is that if fewer than h − t servers dis-
agreed, then there can be no other polynomial φ′ for which
|Γ(φ′)| ≥ h: φ′ would have to agree with φ on more than t
points of I, and so φ′ = φ.Parameters:
ℓ: number of servers
t: the desired privacy level; that is, the number of servers that can collude without learning
anything about the query
n: size of the database (in bits)
b: size of each block (in bits)
w: size of each word within a block (in bits)
S: either a ﬁeld or a ring Zpq such that |S| ≥ 2w (so that each word can be represented by an element of S)
I: a set of Shamir indices from S such that |I| ≥ ℓ
Calculate:
r: number of blocks = n/b
s: number of words per block = b/w
Client (querying for block number β):
P1. Choose ℓ random distinct indices α1,...,αℓ from I.
P2. Choose r random polynomials f1,...,fr of degree t. The coefﬁcients of each
polynomial should be random elements of S, except for the constant terms.
The constant term of fj should be δjβ.
P3. Compute ρi = [f1(αi),...,fr(αi)] for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
P4. Send ρi to server number i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
Each (honest) server:
S1. Receive ρi = [ρi1,...,ρir], a vector of r elements of S.
S2. Let Wjc be the cth w-bit word of the jth b-bit block of the database, interpreted as a member of S.
S3. Compute Ric =
X
1≤j≤r
ρijWjc for 1 ≤ c ≤ s.
S4. Return [Ri1,...,Ris] to the client.
Client:
C1. Receive [R11,...,R1s],...,[Rℓ1,...,Rℓs] from the ℓ servers.
If server j does not respond at all, set Rjc =⊥ for each 1 ≤ c ≤ s.
Let γ1,...,γk be the numbers of the k servers which did respond.
Let G = {γ1,...,γk} and H = {(G,ǫ)}.
C2. If k ≤ t, abort with the error “not enough servers replied”.
C3. Select h (the minimum number of honest servers) from the range
√
kt < h ≤ k.
C4. For c from 1 to s:
C5. Set H′ ← EASYRECOVER(S,w,t,h,H,[R1c,...,Rℓc],[α1,...,αℓ])
C6. If H′ is the empty set, set H′ ← HARDRECOVER(S,w,t,h,H,[R1c,...,Rℓc],[α1,...,αℓ])
C7. If H′ is the empty set, abort with the error “not enough honest servers replied”.
C8. Set H ← H′.
C9. The resulting H will be a non-empty set of pairs (G,B). One of the Bs will be the correct block;
see section 3.4 for ways to ensure there is only one such B.
Figure 2. A t-private v-Byzantine-robust k-out-of-ℓ information-theoretic PIR scheme for 0 < t < k and
v < k − ⌊
√
kt⌋.Inputs:
S: the structure used for Shamir secret sharing
w: the number of bits per word
t: the desired privacy level of the PIR protocol
h: the minimum number of honest servers that need to respond (h > t)
H: a nonempty set of pairs (G,σ) where G is a set of at least h server numbers,
and σ is the portion of the requested block recovered so far, assuming that
the servers in G were the honest ones. Each σ will have the same length.
No two of the G will have more than t elements in common.
[R1,...,Rℓ]: t-private ℓ-way purported shares of a w-bit word that had been encoded as a member
of S. It must not be the case that Rj =⊥ for any j in any of the G in H.
[α1,...,αℓ]: the indices used for the secret sharing
Output:
Either: (1) a set H′ of the same form as H, above, but with each σ being w bits longer
than those in the input, or (2) the empty set
EASYRECOVER(S,w,t,h,H,[R1,...,Rℓ],[α1,...,αℓ]):
E1. Set H′ ← {}.
E2. For each (G,σ) ∈ H:
/* Optimistically hope the rest of the servers are honest */
E3. Select a random subset I ⊆ G of size t + 1.
E4. Use Lagrange interpolation to ﬁnd the unique polynomial φ over S of degree t
for which φ(αj) = Rj for each j ∈ I.
E5. Let W be the w-bit representation of φ(0), or ⊥ if there is no such representation.
E6. If |G ∩ Γ(φ)| ≥ h and |G\Γ(φ)| < h − t and W  =⊥ then add (G ∩ Γ(φ),σ||W) to H′.
E7. Otherwise, immediately return the empty set.
E8. Return H′.
HARDRECOVER(S,w,t,h,H,[R1,...,Rℓ],[α1,...,αℓ]):
H1. Set H′ ← {}.
H2. Use the algorithm of [7] to recover (in polynomial time) the set {φi} of polynomials over
S of degree ≤ t for which φi(αj) = Rj for at least h values of j ∈ {1,...,ℓ}.
H3. For each such φi:
H4. Let Wi be the w-bit representation of φi(0), or ⊥ if there is no such representation.
H5. If Wi  =⊥, then for any (G,σ) ∈ H such that |Γ(φi) ∩ G| ≥ h,
add (Γ(φi) ∩ G,σ||Wi) to H′.
H6. Return H′.
Figure 3. The EASYRECOVER and HARDRECOVER subroutines.NotethatinthepresenceofByzantineservers, EASYRE-
COVER may not always ﬁnd the unique polynomial, even if
there is one, but in no case will it output a non-empty set
when more possibilities exist.
3.1. Privacy of the protocol
It is easy to see that no coalition of up to t servers can
learn any information about β (the requested block num-
ber): between them, they have at most t of the t-private
ℓ-way shares of the vector eβ (as in section 2.2). By the
properties of Shamir secret sharing, they learn no informa-
tion about eβ, and therefore about β.
It is important to note that this result holds even if some
servers are Byzantine, since all of the information ﬂowing
fromthe client to the servershappensbeforethe serversper-
form any actions.
3.2. Correctness of the protocol without
Byzantine servers
In this section, we show that this protocol returns the
correct block B from the database when no server responds
incorrectly (but some may not respond at all), so long as
enough servers do respond.
Theorem 1. If k of the ℓ servers respond, there are no
Byzantine servers, and k > t, then the algorithm in Fig-
ure 2 will return a set H containing the single pair (G,B),
where G is the set of the k server numbers that responded,
and B is the correct block Bβ from the database.
Proof sketch. (See Appendix A for the complete proof.)
The important observation is that if ℓ vectors ρ1,...,ρℓ
are t-private ℓ-way secret shares of a vector   v of length r,
and   w is any vector of length r, then the ℓ dot products
ρ1     w,...,ρℓ     w are t-private ℓ-way secret shares of the
scalar   v     w.
In this protocol, each server has its share ρi of   v = eβ.
Also, foreach c from1 to s (wheres is the numberof words
per block), each server constructs the vector   wc, which is
the vector of length r (the number of blocks) whose jth el-
ement is the cth word of the jth block of the database. Then
each server’s returned value Ric = ρi     wc will be its share
of eβ     wc, which is just the cth word of the βth block of
the database. Since the client receives more than t of these
results, it can uniquely reconstruct each of the words of the
βth block of the database, and concatenating them repro-
duces the desired block.
3.3. Correctness in the presence of Byzan-
tine servers
We will now look at the effect of Byzantine servers on
the correctness of this protocol.
Theorem 2. If k of the ℓ servers respond at all, k > t, and
at least h >
√
kt servers respond honestly, then the algo-
rithm in Figure 2 will return a set H, one of whose elements
is the pair (Gh,Bβ), where Gh is the set of the server num-
bers that responded honestly, and Bβ is the correct block
from the database.
Proof sketch. (See AppendixA for the complete proof.) As
above,thehhonestserversreturntheirsharesofthes words
of the βth block of the database. However, k − h additional
servers return arbitrary values. Depending on the values of
h, k and t, there may no longer be a unique block deter-
mined by h of the k received shares, but when h >
√
kt
we can use the algorithm of [7] to ﬁnd a list of all possi-
ble blocks in polynomial time. In the next section, we will
see a number of ways to recover the correct block from this
list.
3.4. List-decoding
The algorithm of Figure 2 is an example of a list-
decoding algorithm; that is, under some circumstances, it
may output a list of more than one data block, and we must
provide some way for the client to determine which is the
correct block. On the one hand, the potential to list-decode
is onesourceofthe improvementsin theprivacyandrobust-
ness parameters of the protocol of this section over that of
previous work such as Beimel and Stahl [2]. On the other
hand, we need to be able to recover the correct database
block.
The source of the list-decoding is that, in the presence of
many Byzantine servers, there may be more than one poly-
nomial φ such that |Γ(φ)| ≥ h. (Recall that Γ(φ) is the set
ofservernumberswhichreturnedrepliesconsistentwiththe
polynomial φ.) There are a number of ways to handle this
and recover the unique correct result.
The simplest way to handle list-decoding is simply to
choose yourparameters such that there cannot be more than
one such φ.
Fact 2. If h > k+t
2 , then there is exactly one polynomial φ
of degree at most t for which |Γ(φ)| ≥ h.
Proof. Suppose the correct polynomial is φ0, so that
|Γ(φ0)| ≥ h, since all h honest servers will respond cor-
rectly. Now suppose it is the case that |Γ(φ)| ≥ h for some
φ. It is always the case that |Γ(φ0) ∩ Γ(φ)| = |Γ(φ0)| +
|Γ(φ)| −|Γ(φ0) ∪ Γ(φ)|. But since |Γ(φ0) ∪ Γ(φ)| ≤ k (as
only k servers responded), we have that |Γ(φ0) ∩ Γ(φ)| ≥
h + h − k > (k + t) − k = t. So φ0 and φ agree on more
than t points of I, and are therefore equal.
Therefore, if h > k+t
2 , we will never have to handle
more than one possible polynomial. However, we may liketobeabletouselowervaluesofh. Thefollowingfactshows
how to handle values of h > k/2.
Fact 3. If the Byzantine servers are unable to see the com-
municationbetweentheclientandthehonestservers (which
should be the case, as it is important for privacy), and
h > k/2, then by choosing the index set I to be sufﬁciently
large, we can make the probability that the algorithm of
Figure 2 outputs more than one block arbitrarily small.
Proof sketch. (See Appendix A for the complete proof.)
Suppose the algorithm of Figure 2 outputs more than one
block. Then it must be the case that the Byzantine servers
were able to provide responses such that there is an incor-
rect polynomial φ of degree t which agrees with at least
h of the k total responses. Since there are at most k − h
Byzantine servers, and k − h < k/2 < h, we must have
that φ(αi) = φ0(αi), where φ0 is the correct polynomial,
for at least one of the honest servers’ αi.
Now the key observation is that the Byzantine servers
do not know the indices associated with the honest servers.
Remember that φ can agree with φ0 in at most t places.
Therefore, if I, the set of possible indices, is very large,
then the probability that one of those places happens to be
an index associated with one of the honest servers will be
very small.
Notethatift ≥ k
4,thenwealwayshaveh >
√
kt ≥ k/2.
Also recall that the size of the index set I can be chosen to
be |S| − 1 (if S is a ﬁeld) or min(p,q) − 1 (if S is Zpq).
Finally, in the event that t < k
4 and we want to allow for
k/2 or more Byzantine servers, we can just use the usual
techniques (such as those of [9]) to add redundancy to the
words of the database, so that the list decoding can be con-
verted to unique decoding. Note that this will slightly in-
crease the size of the database. This redundancycould be in
the form of digital signatures from the database creator, for
example. In a situation where there is for some reason no
suchindependentcreator,allowingamajorityofresponding
servers to be Byzantine may not make sense; in that case, it
is not clear what it means for a block to be “correct” when
more than half of the servers are storing a different block.
3.5. Comparison to previous results
Privacy and robustness. The authors of [2] show that t-
private v-Byzantine-robust k-out-of-ℓ PIR protocols exist
for v ≤ t < k
3. We have demonstrated such a protocol for
0 < t < k and v < k − ⌊
√
kt⌋. Our protocol can therefore
withstand at least three times as many servers colluding to
determine the client’s query, and when the privacy level t is
the same (for some 0 < t < k
3), our protocol tolerates up to
k−⌊
√
kt⌋−1 Byzantine servers, while that of [2] tolerates
up to t. We now show that in these comparable cases, our
result is always at least as good, and almost always strictly
better:
Theorem 3. For integers k,t such that 0 < t < k
3, we have
k − ⌊
√
kt⌋ − 1 ≥ t, with equality if and only if (t,k) =
(1,4).
Proof. We equivalently prove that
k−⌊
√
kt⌋−1−t
t ≥ 0, with
equality if and only if (t,k) = (1,4).
First note that
k − ⌊
√
kt⌋ − 1 − t
t
≥
k −
√
kt − 1 − t
t
=
k
t
−
r
k
t
−
1
t
− 1
=
r
k
t
 r
k
t
− 1
!
−
1
t
− 1
with equality if and only if kt is a perfect square. Now
k ≥ 3t + 1, so k
t ≥ 3 + 1
t, and
r
k
t
 r
k
t
− 1
!
−
1
t
− 1
≥
r
3 +
1
t
 r
3 +
1
t
− 1
!
−
1
t
− 1
=
￿
3 +
1
t
￿
−
r
3 +
1
t
−
1
t
− 1
= 2 −
r
3 +
1
t
with equality if and only if k = 3t + 1. Finally, we have
that 2 −
q
3 + 1
t ≥ 0, with equality if and only if t = 1,
and the result is proven.
Note that (t,k) = (1,4) is the minimal conﬁguration of
the system in [2].
Communication cost. This protocol sends r = n/b el-
ements of S to each of ℓ servers, and receives s = b/w
elements of S from each of k servers in reply. If it takes z
bits to encode an arbitrary element of S (so z = ⌈lg(|S|)⌉),
then the total communicationcost is nℓz/b+kbz/w. Since
k ≤ ℓ, this is bounded by ℓz(n/b + b/w). By choosing
b =
√
nw, we get r = s =
p
n/w and the total com-
munication cost to privately retrieve a block of
√
nw bits
is bounded by 2ℓz
p
n/w. Remember that we needed to
choose S such that |S| ≥ 2w; if we make it not much big-
ger, we can have z = w+1, or even z = w if S is GF(2w).
Then our cost to retrieve
√
nw bits is O(ℓ
√
nw)Notethatthis is farfromtheoptimalcommunicationcost
of retrieving a single bit, even in the context of Byzantine-
robust PIR protocols; for example, the protocol of [2] has
cost O( k
3tn
1
⌊(k−1)/3t⌋ℓ log ℓ) to retrieve one bit. However, it
is clearly within a small factor of optimal if indeed we are
interested in the entire
√
nw-bit block.
4. Robustness against colluding servers
In this section, we consider the problem of more than t
(even up to all ℓ) servers colluding to try to determine the
client’s query.
As mentioned earlier, if all ℓ servers collude, it is impos-
sible to make a protocol with communication cost less than
n which also information-theoretically protects the query.
Therefore, we do the best possible thing: information-
theoretically protect the query if up to t servers collude, but
still computationally protect the query even if up to all ℓ
servers collude. We call a PIR protocol with this property
t-private ℓ-computationally-private.
We do this with a simple modiﬁcation to the protocol
of Figure 2: instead of sending t-private ℓ-way shares of
eβ to the servers, send encryptions of those shares, under
an additive homomorphiccryptosystem, such as the Paillier
cryptosystem [10] (see section 2.3). The servers then use
the homomorphic property to compute the encryptions of
their results, which they send back to the client. The client
decrypts the replies and proceeds as before.
In detail, the changes to the protocol of Figure 2 are:
• To start, select large random distinct primes p and q.
Set m = pq, choose S to be the ring Zm, and let
I = {1,2,...,min(p,q) − 1}. Compute the Paillier
encryption and decryption keys as in section 2.3.
• In step P3, use Paillier encryption to compute E(ρi) =
[E(f1(αi)),...,E(fr(αi))].
• In step P4, send E(ρi) to server i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
• In step S1, E(ρi) = [E(ρi1),...,E(ρir)] will be a vec-
tor of r elements of Zm2.
• In step S3, compute E(Ric) =
Y
1≤j≤r
E(ρij)Wjc as el-
ements of Zm2 for 1 ≤ c ≤ s.
• In step S4, return [E(Ri1),...,E(Ris)] to the client.
• In step C1, use Paillier decryption to compute Ric =
D(E(Ric)), and then proceed as before.
This modiﬁed protocol still allows the client to recover
the desired block Bβ, even when only k of the ℓ servers re-
spond, and v < k − ⌊
√
kt⌋ of those k are Byzantine. This
fact follows immediately from the equivalent result for the
original protocol in Figure 2: once the client receives and
decrypts the servers’ replies, he has the same information
as he would have had, had none of the encryption or de-
cryption happened.
The information-theoretic protection of the client’s
queryagainstcoalitions of up to t servers is also immediate:
if a coalition of t servers, knowing t of the ρi, cannot learn
any information about β, then certainly if those servers in-
stead knowE(ρi), that does not givethem more information
about β. Formally, given any algorithm A that can recover
information about β given t of the E(ρi), one can easily
construct an algorithm A′ that recovers that same informa-
tion about β given t of the ρi, by ﬁrst encryptingthe ρi, and
passing the results to A. Since there is no such A′, there is
also no such A.
Now we turn our attention to the case in which up to all
ℓ of the servers collude. The privacy consideration is only
interesting if there is more than one block in the database,
so we assume r ≥ 2.
Theorem4. Givenaﬁxedm,ifthereisaprobabilisticpoly-
nomial time algorithm A which can distinguish Paillier en-
cryptionsof t-privateℓ-wayShamirsecret sharesof thevec-
tor e1 from Paillier encryptions of t-private ℓ-way Shamir
secret shares of the vector e2 with some probability ψ, then
there is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A′ which
can distinguish Paillier encryptions of the number 0 from
Paillier encryptions of the number 1 with the same proba-
bility ψ.
Proof. Suppose the given algorithm A takes as input Pail-
lier encryptions of t-private ℓ-way secret shares of eβ for
some β ∈ {1,2}, and, to be generous, the ℓ indices used for
the Shamir secret sharing, and A outputs β′ ∈ {1,2}. Then
by assumption, Pr[β′ = 1|β = 1] − Pr[β′ = 1|β = 2] = ψ.
The desired algorithm A′ is as follows:
Input:
A ciphertext C = E(ζ), for some ζ ∈ {0,1}.
Output:
A guess ζ′ at the value of ζ.
Algorithm:
1. Choose ℓ random distinct indices α1,...,αℓ from
Zm. Verify that gcd(αi,m) = 1 for each i and that
gcd(αi − αj,m) = 1 for each i,j.
2. Choose r random polynomials f1,...,fr of degree t.
The coefﬁcients of each polynomial should be random
elements of Zm, except for the constant terms. The
constant term of each fj should be 0.
3. Compute E(ρi) = [E(f1(αi))   C,E(f2(αi))  
E(1)/C,E(f3(αi)),...,E(fr(αi))] for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
4. Output ζ′ =
(2 − A([E(ρ1),...,E(ρℓ)],[α1,...,αℓ])).To see why this works, notice that [fj(α1),...,fj(αℓ)]
are t-private ℓ-way secret shares of the value 0, for each
1 ≤ j ≤ r. Therefore [f1(α1) + ζ,...,f1(αℓ) + ζ] are t-
privateℓ-waysecret shares of the value ζ, and [f2(α1)+1−
ζ,...,f2(αℓ) + 1 − ζ] are t-private ℓ-way secret shares of
thevalue1−ζ. But bythehomomorphicpropertyofPaillier
encryption,E(f1(αi)) C is anencryptionoff1(αi)+ζ, and
E(f2(αi))   E(1)/C is an encryption of f2(αi) + 1 − ζ, so
[E(ρ1),...,E(ρℓ)] are t-private ℓ-way shares of e2 if ζ = 0,
and of e1 if ζ = 1. Therefore Pr[ζ′ = 1|ζ = 1] − Pr[ζ′ =
1|ζ = 0] = Pr[β′ = 1|β = 1] − Pr[β′ = 1|β = 2] = ψ, and
the result is proven.
Remembering from section 2.3 that the the Paillier cryp-
tosystem is semantically secureif and onlyif the Decisional
Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA) holds (for the
value of m used in the cryptosystem), we get the following:
Corollary. The protocol of this section maintains the pri-
vacy of the query against coalitions of up to all ℓ servers,
providedthe Decisional Composite Residuosity Assumption
holds for those servers, for the value of m used in the pro-
tocol.
That is, so longas the serversdo not havesufﬁcient com-
putational power to break the DCRA, they will be unable to
distinguish queries for block 1 from queries for block 2. By
symmetry (there is nothing special about blocks 1 and 2),
the servers will be unable to distinguish any one query from
another.
4.1. Communication cost
The only change to the communication cost is that el-
ements of Zm2 are being sent between the client and the
servers, instead of elements of S = Zm. This causes all
communication to approximately double in size, increasing
the communicationcost by the constant factor of 2; the cost
is still O(ℓ
√
nw) to retrieve
√
nw bits.
4.2. Notes on the choices of parameters
It should be noted that in both the original scheme given
in Figure 2, and this modiﬁcation, the choice of almost all
the parameters, including t, b, w, S, I, the αi, and h, is
done by the client. Furthermore, each client using the same
databasecanchoosehis ownvaluesforthe parametersinde-
pendently of any other clients’ choices. (In that case, how-
ever, b, w, and S need to be communicated to the server
during the protocol, marginally increasing the communica-
tion cost.)
S should be chosen as small as needed to achieve the de-
sired security properties, since the communication cost of
the protocol depends on the size of S. Note, however, that
although using a larger S will result in a higher communi-
cation cost, the client will also retrieve a correspondingly
larger database block.
For example, in the protocol of this section, the DCRA
needs to hold over S = Zm, so m needs to be chosen to be
at least 1024 bits long (since the DCRA is clearly at most
as hard as factoring m).
On the other hand, if the protocol is not required to be ℓ-
computationally-private,much smaller structures S will do.
Minimally,we must have|S| ≥ ℓ+1, and this valuesufﬁces
if h > k+t
2 , as in Fact 2, or if we are using redundancy
to avoid list decoding. If we are using Fact 3 to avoid list
decoding, then we will probably want to choose |S| to be
around 2128.
Once we have selected S, the best choices for w and b
are then ⌊lg(|S|)⌋ and
√
nw, respectively.
5. Protecting the data from the servers
In this section, we give a small enhancement to the pro-
tocols of the previous sections that allows the contents of
the database itself to be hidden from coalitions of up to τ
servers, for 0 ≤ τ < k − t − v(2 − v
k). We achieve
τ-independence, as deﬁned in [5]: no coalition of up to
τ servers has any information about the content of the
database (in the information-theoretic sense). Unlike the
result in [5], however, we do not achieve τ-independence at
the expense of an increased number of servers or at the ex-
pense of communication cost: the number of servers and
communication cost of the τ-independent version of our
scheme are identical to those of the regular version.
The major change we make to our protocol in order to
achieve τ-independence is that, in this scheme, the choices
of S, I, and the indices αi need to be made in advance of
storing data in the database. This condition imposes the
following restrictions on the use of the scheme:
• If it is intended that the user storing the information
in the database is different from the client retrieving
the data, or if there is more than one such client, they
cannot rely on the secrecy of the αi to get the bene-
ﬁt of Fact 3. They need to use redundancy techniques
instead, as mentioned in section 3.4, or reduce the al-
lowed number of Byzantine servers to at most k−t−τ
2 .
• If it is intended that there is more than one client re-
trieving data, this scheme cannot be used at the same
timeastheschemefromsection4: inthelatterscheme,
S was chosen to be Zpq for secret values p and q. Mul-
tiple clients would not use the same S, and so with this
variant, could not use the same database at all.
At system setup time, S and the αi are chosen, and com-
municated to all of the users of the database (either usersstoring data, or users retrieving data). S must be communi-
cated to the servers as well, but the αi need not be.
As before, the database is divided into r = n/b b-bit
blocks,andeachblockis dividedintos = b/w w-bit words.
ButinsteadoftheserveristoringtheswordsWj1,...,Wjs
of block number j directly, it stores each block as a se-
quence of s elements ω
(i)
j1 ,...,ω
(i)
js of S.
The computation of these ω
(i)
jc uses Shamir secret shar-
ing. In particular,a user that wants to store database blockj
divides it into s words Wj1,...,Wjs, and does the follow-
ing for each 1 ≤ c ≤ s:
• Choose a random polynomial gjc of degree τ. The co-
efﬁcients of gjc should be random elements of S, ex-
cept for the constant term, which should be Wjc (en-
coded as a member of S).
• Send gjc(αi) to server i to store as its ω
(i)
jc , for each
1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ.
That is, the values of ω
(i)
jc for 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ are just τ-private
ℓ-way Shamir secret shares of Wjc.
The modiﬁcations to the protocol of Figure 2 are now
straightforward:
• Remove step S2, and use ω
(i)
jc instead of Wjc in step
S3.
• In step C2, check that k ≤ t + τ instead of k ≤ t.
• Instep C3, chooseh fromthe range
p
k(t + τ) < h ≤
k instead of
√
kt < h ≤ k.
• In steps C5 and C6, pass t + τ instead of t.
We note that our choice of 0 ≤ τ < k−t−v(2− v
k) en-
sures that the same values of h, v, t, k, and ℓ we used in the
originalprotocolwill continueto workin the τ-independent
version. In particular, choosing τ from this range guaran-
tees that k ≤ t + τ and
p
k(t + τ) < h ≤ k.
We alsonotethatifwesetτ = 0,wegetexactlythesame
protocol as before, since 0-private ℓ-way shares of Wjc are
just ℓ copies of Wjc itself.
Why does this work? Step S3 computes Ric to be X
1≤j≤r
ρijω
(i)
jc =
X
1≤j≤r
fj(αi)gjc(αi) = Fc(αi), where Fc
is the polynomialFc =
X
1≤j≤r
fjgjc of degree at most t+τ.
Note, however,that it is not necessarilythe case that the Ric
are (t + τ)-private ℓ-way shares of Fc(0) = Wβc, since the
distributionof the Fc is not uniform. In particular,it may be
possible to learn some information about Wβc given t + τ
of the Fc(αi). However, it is still the case that any t+τ +1
of the Fc(αi) uniquely determines Fc, and that is the only
fact we use in our reconstruction of Wβc.
Therefore, we have constructed a t-private v-Byzantine-
robust τ-independent k-out-of-ℓ PIR protocol for 0 < t ≤
t + τ < k, and v < k − ⌊
p
k(t + τ)⌋. This protocol has
communication cost O(ℓ
√
nw) to retrieve
√
nw bits of the
database. If there is to be only one client retrievingdata, we
canuseboththeextensionsofthis sectionandofsection4at
the same time, and add ℓ-computationally-privateto the list
ofproperties,at a cost ofafactorof2in thecommunication.
6. Implementation details
We implemented the protocols in this paper in C++, us-
ing Victor Shoup’s NTL library [15], except for one part of
step H2 of the HARDRECOVER subroutine, which is cur-
rently performed by the computer algebra system MuPAD
[13]. Ourimplemenationis available as the Percy++project
on SourceForge [6].
We measured the computational performance of these
protocols on a Lenovo T60p laptop computer with a
2.16 GHz dual-core Intel CPU running Ubuntu Linux in or-
der to determine their practicality.
We ﬁrst measured the performance of the proto-
col of Figure 2; that is, the protocol without the ℓ-
computationally-private and τ-independent properties. We
used a range of values of n, t, ℓ, and w, and we set k = ℓ in
all cases.
Figure 4 shows some representative results. In
these cases, the were no Byzantine servers, so the
HARDRECOVER subroutine was never executed. Fig-
ure 4(a) shows the client’s processing time, as a function
of the database size, for various values of w. In this plot,
we set (t,k) = (12,20). The plot suggests a square-root
dependence on the database size, which agrees with an ex-
amination of the algorithm. We conﬁrm this by squaring
the measurements; the results are shown in Figure 4(b),
which indeed produces linear graphs. Figure 4(c) shows
the servers’ processing time, and again as expected, this is
linear in the database size. Finally, Figure 4(d) shows that
for ﬁxed k, the client’s runningtime dependslinearly on the
privacy level t. As a numeric example, for w = 128, the
client processing takes 44
√
n microseconds, and the server
processing takes 9.6n nanoseconds.
When we introduce Byzantine servers, the
HARDRECOVER subroutine gets executed. As expected,
this is noticeably more expensive than the EASYRECOVER
subroutine. For (t,k) = (5,10), for example, it adds a
couple of seconds to the client’s processing time. For
(t,k) = (10,20), it adds several minutes. However, this is
not onerous, since it is likely that the mere ability of the
client to detect which servers are returning incorrect results
will deter the servers from doing so. Therefore, we expect
to use the HARDRECOVER subroutine only rarely.
Addingτ-independence(themodiﬁcationtotheprotocol 0
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Figure 4. Performance measurements for the protocol of Figure 2.
from Section 5) is, as expected, quite cheap. In Figure 5
we plot timings of the t-private τ-independent version of
the protocol. In each graph, we ﬁx w = 128, k = 20,
and n = 225, and vary t and τ such that 0 < t < t +
τ < k. In Figure 5(a) we see that the server’s processing
time is independent of both t and τ. We divide the client’s
processing time into two parts: Figure 5(b) shows the time
it takes the client to prepare its query (the steps labelled
“P” in Figure 2), and Figure 5(c) shows the time it takes the
client to reconstruct the data block (the steps labelled “C”
in Figure 2). The graphs clearly show that the preparation
time is linearly dependent on t, but independent of τ, and
the reconstruction time is linearly dependent on t + τ, as
would be expected from the algorithm. The careful reader
will note that the sum of the times in Figures 5(b) and 5(c)
is slightly less than the corresponding times in Figure 4(d);
this is becausetheαi are ﬁxedin the τ-independentversion,
and are in fact chosen to be the very simple αi = i.
On the other hand, adding ℓ-computational privacy (the
modiﬁcation from Section 4) is quite expensive. The server
needs to perform one modular exponentiation for each w-
bit word in the database. The plots have the same shape as
those of Figure 4, but the scale is different: for w = 1024,
k = 5, and t = 4, we ﬁnd the client’s processing time is
15
√
n milliseconds, and the server’s processing time is 30n
microseconds. For values of n in the hundreds of millions
of bits or more, these times are substantial.
7. Conclusion
We have improvedthe robustnessof protocolsforprivate
informationretrieval in a number of ways. Compared to the
previous scheme in [2], our basic protocol allows for more
servers to collude without compromisingthe user’s privacy.
Moreover, maintaining the same privacy level as in [2], we
enable the reconstruction of the correct data block when
more servers return faulty responses. We extended this pro-
tocol to add hybrid privacy protection; that is, information-
theoretic protection if up to t servers collude (for some
t < k ≤ ℓ), but still computational protection if up to all
ℓ collude. Finally, we presented another extension which
added τ-independence to the protocol while increasing nei-
ther the number of servers, nor the communication cost.
We implemented and measured these protocols and
found the performance to agree well with theory. With the
exceptionof the hybridprivacyprotection,our implementa-
tion gives practical speeds for moderately sized databases.
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Proof of Theorem 1. In step P2, the client deﬁnes r polyno-
mials f1,...,fr of degree t. Deﬁne the s polynomials Fc
to be Fc =
X
1≤j≤r
fjWjc for 1 ≤ c ≤ s, where the Wjc are
the words in the database as deﬁned as in step S2. Note that
these polynomialsFc are also of degree(at most) t, and also
that Fc(0) =
X
1≤j≤r
fj(0)Wjc =
X
1≤j≤r
δjβWjc = Wβc.
Suppose server i is one of the servers that responds. In
step S1, it receives [f1(αi),...,fr(αi)] from the client. In
step S3, it computes Ric =
X
1≤j≤r
fj(αi)Wjc = Fc(αi) for
1 ≤ c ≤ s, and returns these values to the client in step S4.
The client initializes H to be {(G,ǫ)} in step C1, where
G is the set of server numbers that responded. We claim
that after x iterations of the loop at C4, H will be the set
{(G,B
(xw)
β )}, where B
(xw)
β is a string consisting of the
ﬁrst xw bits of the database block Bβ. We proceed by
induction: we have already shown that this is the case for
x = 0. Suppose it is true for x = c−1 for some 1 ≤ c ≤ s.
Now consider iteration c. In step C5, the client calls
EASYRECOVER(S,w,t,h,H,[R1c,...,Rℓc],[α1,...,αℓ])
where Rjc = Fc(αj) for each j ∈ G.
By the induction hypothesis, there is exactly one ele-
ment of H, so the loop at E2 will execute only once. In
step E4, the client will necessarily ﬁnd φ = Fc, since
φ(αj) = Rjc = Fc(αj) for each j ∈ G, and so for each
j ∈ I ⊆ G. Since these two polynomials φ and Fc of de-
gree at most t agree on at least t + 1 points of I, they must
be equal. Therefore the W in step E5 will just be the w-bit
representation of Fc(0) = Wβc, which is the cth w-bit word
of block β of the database.
Then in step E6, Γ(φ) ∩ G will equal G, so H′ will be
set to {(G,σ||W)}. By the induction hypothesis, σ is the
ﬁrst (c−1)w bits of Bβ, so σ||W is the ﬁrst cw bits of Bβ,
and the proof of the claim is complete.
Therefore, after all s = b/w iterations of the loop at C4,
H will equal {(G,Bβ)}, as required.
Proof of Theorem 2. As above, we will prove that after x
iterations of the loop at C4, H will be a set containing the
element (G
(x)
h ,B
(xw)
β ) where G
(x)
h is the set of server num-
bers that both replied at all, and also replied honestly in the
ﬁrst xwordsofits reply,andB
(xw)
β is deﬁnedas before. For
x = 0, this is trivially true. Suppose it is true for x = c − 1
for some 1 ≤ c ≤ s. Now consider iteration c. We can
assume the client calls HARDRECOVER in step C6, since
as we noted earlier, EASYRECOVER produces the same an-
swer as HARDRECOVER when it produces an answer at all.
HARDRECOVER will produce a set of polynomials in
step H2, one of which will necessarily be Fc (as deﬁned
above). This set may have polynomially (in k) many el-
ements, but we will see in section 3.4 that the probability
that this set contains elements other than the desired one
can be made arbitrarily small, ensuring that the entire pro-
tocol runs in (probabilistic) polynomial time. When the
loop at H3 encounters the element Fc, Wi will be set to
Fc(0) = Wβc (asdeﬁnedabove). Bytheinductionhypothe-
sis, step H5 will ﬁnd the element (G
(c−1)
h ,B
((c−1)w)
β ) ∈ H.
But also Γ(Fc) ⊇ Gh, so Γ(Fc) ∩ G
(c−1)
h ⊇ Gh, so
|Γ(Fc) ∩ G
(c−1)
h | ≥ h. Then step H5 will add (Γ(Fc) ∩
G
(c−1)
h ,B
((c−1)w)
β ||Wβc) = (G
(c)
h ,B
(cw)
β ) to H′, and the
proof is complete.
Proof of Fact 3. We start with the following Lemma:
Lemma. There is a polynomial PS(k), depending only on
whether S is a ring or a ﬁeld, such that the size of the set
of candidate polynomials {φi} output in step H2 is at most
PS(k).
Proof of Lemma. For ﬁelds S, the algorithm of [7] works
by constructing a bivariate polynomial Q(x,y) over S
with the property that for any (univariate) polynomial
φ such that |Γ(φ)| ≥ h, it is the case that (y −
φ(x)) is a factor of Q. This polynomial Q has degree ￿
1
t
￿
h − 1 + h
￿
kt+
√
(kt)2+4(h2−kt)
2(h2−kt)
￿￿￿
iny, sothenum-
ber of such factors is at most that value. (The denominator
of this value is what produces the restriction that h >
√
kt.)
With some simple algebra, it is easy to see that if 1 ≤ t < k
and
√
kt < h ≤ k, that value is bounded by 2k2.
For rings S = Zpq, we proceed modulo p and q sepa-
rately, and combine the results using the Chinese Remain-
der Theorem, matching factors using Γ(φ). This can poten-
tially increase the bound on the number of possible results
to (2k2)2.
Note that neither of these bounds is tight.
Each of the at most s calls to HARDRECOVER will pro-
duce a set of at most PS(k) polynomials in step H2. Each
of these polynomials φ will have |Γ(φ)| ≥ h. But since
h, the number of honest servers, is more than half the total
numberof servers that replied, at least some of the elements
of Γ(φ) must be server numbers of honest servers. For each
φ, there must be at least one such element, and for each φ
other than the correct one, there must be at most t (other-
wise, φ would agree with the correct polynomial in more
than t places, and so it would indeed be the correct polyno-
mial). The key observation, similar to that in [16], is that if
the Byzantineserverscannotknowthe values ofαj forhon-
est server numbers j, then they only have a small chance of
producing incorrect polynomials that agree with the correct
polynomial at one of the honest αj.Let Z be the set {αj : server j is not honest}, and Y be
the set {αj : server j is honest}. We want to bound the
probability that, of the ≤ sPS(k) polynomials returned in
step H2, and of the ≤ t points of I\Z at which each of these
polynomials agree with the correct polynomials, the result-
ing ≤ stPS(k) points have non-trivial intersection with the
set Y . But |I\Z| = |I| − (ℓ − h), and |Y | = h, so that
probability is at most
hstPS(k)
|I|−ℓ+h , as required.